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contain the reason why he has been determined to be ineligible. The written notice will provide a basis for the individual to express dissatisfaction with the agency action. (See IV–6000 re Hearings.)

6. The State plan must provide reporting and other administrative and supervisory methods for obtaining information about whether local agencies carry out the State plan provisions and meet Federal requirements in determination of eligibility, thus enabling the State agency to identify problem areas and take corrective action. (See II–4200, item 3, re State-wide operation.)

THE AIRLINES STRIKE—POLITICS VERSUS PUBLIC INTEREST

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I invite the Senate's attention to an excellent editorial about the airlines strike, which was published in today's New York Times. Clearly, it is high time that the White House actively intervene in efforts to bring this intolerable strike against the public interest to a prompt conclusion. I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, July 28, 1966]

POLITICS VERSUS PUBLIC INTEREST

The only conclusion possible from Secretary of Labor Wirtz' testimony on the airlines strike is that politics is the chief yardstick the White House applies in determining when the cut-off of an essential service creates a national emergency.

The Secretary's recommendation that Congress scrap plans for an immediate back-to-work law and give "free collective bargaining" another chance was a clear capitulation to the dictates of organized labor. Twenty-four hours earlier, while the Senate Labor Committee held off its hearing at the Administration's request, George Meany had given the White House its cue.

"No danger to the nation's health and welfare and no threat to national defense have been demonstrated," the A.F.L.–C.I.O. president declared. "The air traveling public has, of course, been inconvenienced, but inconvenience is a small price to pay for freedom."

Mr. Wirtz put it differently, but came up with the same answer: Do nothing right away. This a week after President Johnson had declared that the strike was trying "the patience of the American people" and that the time had come for a settlement. Mr. Wirtz acknowledged that the tie-up already has had "a serious, substantial, adverse impact on the national interest" and that its prolongation would bring the country to a "crisis" stage at some point.

Why the nation must wait until the hardship becomes intolerable before Congress acts, the Secretary failed to make clear. Even more obscure was his idea of how "free collective bargaining" can be secured in a dispute that has already been reviewed by a Presidential emergency board. That board, headed by Senator WAYNE MORSE, recommended wage increases that went beyond the Administration's anti-inflation guideposts. The President urged both labor and management to follow these proposals; the airlines not only accepted them, they bettered them. The striking machinists still say no.

Presumably what Mr. Wirtz means by his prescription that Congress send both sides "back to the woodshed" with a settlement deadline is that pressure will now be exerted on management to save the union's face by giving it more money. Such appeasement of labor under White House aegis has been the historic road to instability in industrial relations and to wage-price inflation. The airlines, as a regulated industry enjoying record prosperity, are in poor position to hold out against what the Administration wants.

The course Secretary Wirtz has charted points more surely to the destruction of "free collective bargaining" than to its preservation.

VIETNAM

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, the August 8, 1966, issue of Look magazine carries the views of five distinguished Americans on our present involvement in Vietnam. I ask unanimous consent that these stimulating views be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the interviews were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

VIETNAM: SUPPOSE THE PRESIDENT ASKED YOU "WHAT SHOULD WE DO NOW?"—FIVE EXPERTS GIVE THEIR ANSWER

(Produced by Leo Rosten)

(NOTE.—We are at war in Vietnam. Whether we should have gotten into it or not is a separate issue. We are in Vietnam.

(Americans have always backed their armies with the moral certainty that in our victory *right* would triumph. But to many today, our cause seems stained by doubt. Never, during a foreign war, have Americans debated our national policy with such passion: "Get out. . . . Escalate. . . . Negotiate. . . . 'Hole in' at coastal enclaves. . . . Blockade Halphong. . . . Push 'hot pursuit' into Laos" The bitterness of the partisans consolidates the confusion.

(Look invited in five experts, who hold varying views about Vietnam, to answer this question: "Suppose the President today asked you, *'What should we do now?'* " We urged each to reply in the intentionally brief space of 1,000 words—for we sought not a pablum of agreement but sharp, specific proposals.

(Here are their answers. Each man presents a program that millions would no doubt support.)

(By Hans Morgenthau, distinguished service professor of political science and modern history, University of Chicago; director, Center for the Study of American Foreign and Military Policy; has served as consultant to the Department of State and the Department of Defense; author of "In Defense of the National Interest," "The Purpose of American Politics," etc.)

President Johnson is wont to ask the critics of his Vietnam policy, *"What would you do if you were in my place?"* This is a legitimate question, and it deserves an answer. Having been a consistent critic of our Vietnam policies for more than four years, I have tried to answer that question before and am glad to do so again.

Mr. President, I would say, you must choose between two alternative policies. You can start with the assumption that in Vietnam the credibility of the United States and its prestige as a great power are irrevocably engaged; that the war in Vietnam is a test case for all "wars of national liberation"; and that in consequence, the fate of Asia, and perhaps even of the non-Communist world at large, might well be decided in Vietnam. If you believe this, then you must see the war through to victory. That is to say, you must escalate the war both in the South and in the North by committing what will amount (according to authoritative estimates) to a million American combat troops and by bombing, without restrictions, the industrial and population centers of North Vietnam. By doing this, you will destroy Vietnam, North and South, and risk a military confrontation with China or the Soviet Union or both. Yet these risks are justified by the magnitude of the issues at stake.

This is the policy that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been advocating and that you have pursued since February, 1965, even though you have been anxious to differentiate your policy from that of the Joint Chiefs. In truth, the difference between the two has not been one of kind but rather of degree. You have been escalating the war at a slower pace than the Joint Chiefs recommended. But escalate you did, and you will continue escalating because the assumptions from which you have started leave you no choice.

There is another policy, Mr. President, which you could and, in my view, should have pursued. This policy assumes that the war is primarily a civil war; that its global significance is remote; that, far from containing China and communism, it opens the gates to both—by destroying the social fabric of Vietnamese nationalism, which is implacably hostile to China; and that, in consequence, the risks we are taking in the pursuit of victory are out of all proportion to the interests at stake.

We should never have gotten involved in this war, but we are deeply involved in it. The aim of our policy must be to avoid getting more deeply involved in it and to extricate ourselves from it while minimizing our losses. Recent events in Vietnam offer us the opportunity of initiating such a new policy of disengagement.

These events have clearly demonstrated two facts: The Saigon government is hardly worthy of the name; and the great mass of the people of South Vietnam prefer an end to the war rather than a fight to the finish with the Vietcong. The two main arguments with which our involvement has been justified have thus been demolished: that we have a commitment to the government of Saigon to assist it in the fight against the Vietcong; and that the people of South Vietnam want to be saved by us from the Vietcong—even at the risk of their own destruction. The prospect of elections to be held in South Vietnam provides us with the chance to use these new facts for the initiation of a new policy of disengagement. Such a policy would proceed on two fronts, the political and the military.

Politically, we ought to work for the achievement of four goals.

1. We must promote the establishment of a broadly-based government in which the elements seeking an end to the war would have decisive influence. This government would have the task of organizing elections for a constituent assembly and a legislature at an early date. It must be recognized that such elections will neither be representative nor "free." The group that organizes them is likely to win them. Hence, the crucial importance of the composition of the government presiding over the elections.

2. We must see to it that the government that emerges from these elections will negotiate with the Vietcong for a *modus vivendi*. Such a settlement would no doubt increase the risk of a complete takeover by the Vietcong. However, it is quite possible to visualize a coalition government under which different sections of the country, after the model of the Laotian setlement, would be governed by different factions. One can even visualize a South Vietnamese government that would be anxious to maintain its independence *vis-à-vis* the North.

3. We should put United States military forces stationed in South Vietnam at the disposal of the government that emerges from the elections, to be used as bargaining counters in negotiations with the Vietcong. In other words, we would honor our commitments and would leave it to the South Vietnamese Government to interpret them—in order to bring the war to an end.

4. Our ultimate goal would be the withdrawal of our armed forces from South Vietnam. Such a withdrawal would be coor-

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dinated with the progress of negotiations between the government of South Vietnam and the Vietcong. Our military forces would be gradually withdrawn, and our military presence would always be commensurate with the political purposes it is intended to serve.

Pending such a withdrawal, our military policy would come in three parts:

1. We would stop both the bombing of North Vietnam and the search-and-destroy operations in South Vietnam that seek to kill the Vietcong and occupy territory controlled by them. For the continuation of such operations in the North and South is compatible only with a policy aiming at victory, not with one seeking a negotiated settlement among the Vietnamese factions.

2. We would hold the cities and coastal enclaves that we and the South Vietnamese military now control. That is to say, we would be satisfied with a de facto division of South Vietnam.

3. We would expect the Vietcong to reciprocate by ceasing attacks upon the perimeter of our positions and by stopping sabotage within them. It can be assumed that we and the Vietcong have a reciprocal interest in maintaining the military status quo pending negotiations.

The policy here advocated, Mr. President, is anathema to the men who advise you. Yet it has always been supported by officials fairly high in your administration. It now has the support of a number of senators who in the past have been "hawks" rather than "doves."

You, Mr. President, will have to decide whether the present policy—morally dubious, militarily hopeless and risky, politically aimless and counterproductive—shall be continued or whether a better policy shall take its place. You aspire to be a great President. Whether you remain the prisoner of past mistakes or have the courage to correct them will be the test of your greatness.

(By Henry Kissinger, professor of government, Harvard, and member of the Center for International Affairs; consultant to the National Security Council under President Kennedy; author of "The Troubled Partnership," "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," etc.)

The war in Vietnam is dominated by two factors: Withdrawal would be disastrous, and negotiations are inevitable. American policy must take both of these realities into account.

1. The impossibility of withdrawal. An American withdrawal under conditions that could plausibly be represented as a Communist victory would be disastrous for these reasons:

Within the Communist world, Chinese attacks on Soviet "revisionism" have focused on the Russian doctrine of peaceful coexistence. A victory by a third-class Communist peasant state over the United States must strengthen the most bellicose factions in the internecine Communist struggles around the world.

In Southeast Asia, it would demoralize those countries—especially Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand—that have supported our effort.

The long-term orientation of such countries as India and Japan will reflect to a considerable extent their assessment of America's willingness and ability to honor its commitments. For example, whether or not India decides to become a nuclear power depends crucially on its confidence in American support against Chinese nuclear blackmail.

A demonstration of American impotence in Asia cannot fail to lessen the credibility of American pledges in other fields. The stability of areas geographically far removed from Vietnam will be basically affected by the outcome there.

In short, we are on longer fighting in Vietnam only for the Vietnamese. We are also fighting for ourselves and for international stability.

2. The inevitability of negotiation. Historically, the goal of a war, for the United States, has been the destruction of enemy forces. Negotiations could start only after the enemy had been crashed. But the primary issue in Vietnam is political and psychological, not military.

What makes the war so complicated is the existence of a Communist "shadow government," permeating every aspect of Vietnamese life. A favorable outcome depends on the ability to create a political structure that can command the loyalties of the Vietnamese people.

A purely military solution is impossible also because Vietnam directly engages the interests and the prestige of so many major powers. Finally, the Administration has stressed its unconditional readiness to respond to any overture by Hanoi for negotiations.

In these circumstances, the political program—both within Vietnam and for negotiations—is crucial. Military victories will prove empty if they are not coupled with an effort to build political structures. Negotiations will be sterile or dangerous unless we enter them with significant areas of the country substantially free of terror.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

1. Negotiations are likely when Hanoi realizes that its political apparatus in the countryside is being systematically reduced, and that this process will accelerate the longer the war lasts. It follows that the primary goal of military operations should be the creation of secure areas. It is better to have 100-percent control in 40 percent of the country than 40-percent control in 100 percent of the country. This is not to say that we should adopt a static "enclave" theory, which would leave us with three Hong Kongs and two Berlins in the midst of hostile populations. Nor does it mean that we must write off all the territory that we cannot securely control. We will always retain a capacity for preventing the consolidation of Communist control even in areas that we do not control ourselves. It does mean that the highest priority must be given to creating "secure" zones that contain a maximum of population—zones that can be expanded if the war continues and that will give us reliable negotiating counters at a conference.

2. We must understand that political instability in Vietnam reflects the transformation of an essentially feudal structure into a modern state—a process that took centuries in the West. Such a process involves a profound shift of loyalties—a task that would be searing in the best of circumstances, but is compounded by the pressures of civil war. This imposes two requirements on us: (a) We must have compassion for the travail of a society that has been wracked by war for two decades and not use its agony as an alibi for failing in our duty; and (b) we must give special emphasis to building political structures from the ground up.

3. The notion drawn from our experience in Europe, that economic assistance automatically produces political stability, does not apply in Vietnam. On the contrary, there is a danger that our enthusiasm and our concern with technical refinements will overwhelm slender administrative resources and compound political demoralization. The test should be whether a program can enlist local support and thus give the rural population an incentive to defend it. Efforts should be concentrated in areas of maximum military security and spread out from there.

4. It may prove impossible to settle the war at a large conference that deals with all issues simultaneously. If the negotiations are conducted in a forum consisting of many nations that are already rivals (e.g., the U.S.S.R. and Communist China, or the U.S. and France), energies may be dissipated in political jockeying that is peripheral to the central problems in Vietnam. It may be wiser to separate the issues into their component elements, each to be settled by the parties primarily involved. A larger conference could then work out guarantees for settlements already achieved in other forums.

5. The war in Vietnam is a crucial test of American maturity. In the lives of nations, as of individuals, there comes a point when future options are limited by past actions. The choices of 1966 are not those of 1961. We must recognize that to be on the defensive often forces us to be engaged in places chosen by opponents for their difficulty and ambiguity.

We do not have the privilege of deciding to meet only those challenges that most flatter our moral preconceptions. If we cannot deal with political, economic and military problems as an integrated whole, we will not be able to deal with them individually.

(By Hanson W. Baldwin, military editor of the New York Times, Pulitzer Prize winner for journalism, graduate of Annapolis, war correspondent in the South Pacific, North Africa, Normandy, Korea, Vietnam)

It's the eleventh hour in Vietnam. The United States must decide to win or get out. It is not too late to win, but it soon may be.

Victory means, first of all, a Governmental and national determination to win.

Congress should declare a state of national emergency and authorize a limited mobilization. Our trained and ready military power is spread thin all over the world. Limited mobilization would provide—more quickly than any other means—a pool of at least partially trained manpower and organized logistical training and combat units to sustain a rapid buildup in Vietnam and, ultimately, to strengthen our weakened positions in other parts of the world.

The President should be authorized to mobilize up to 500,000 reserves for two-year service. Draft calls should be increased as necessary. All enlistments should be extended for a minimum of six months.

South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand must be regarded as a strategic whole. The war in South Vietnam is clearly nourished from outside. Soldiers, medicines, supplies, and especially arms and ammunition, today reach South Vietnam by sea, from Cambodia, through Laos, and from North Vietnam by any and all methods. Most of the small arms now used by the Vietcong "main-force" units are standardized on the Soviet 7.62-mm caliber basis and are Chinese-manufactured. All of the heavy arms—mortars, antiaircraft guns, SAM missiles, MIG's, IL–28 bombers, and the world's largest helicopter, the Mi–6—are either Chinese- or Russian-manufactured.

We must shut off, to the best of our ability, the stream of Communist supplies *into* North Vietnam. We should turn off the faucet, not merely put a stopper in the drain. This means blocking the seaborne arms traffic to North Vietnam—by mining, bombing, naval gunfire; the sinking of a dredge in the narrow, silted ship channel to Haiphong; by so-called "pacific blockade" or "quarantine" or other means.

The land supply routes, even more important to the Communist war effort, must also be interrupted. Past limitations upon the bombing of railroads and roads, and of the choke points and communications bottlenecks in North Vietnam's extensive road network, must be removed. We must reduce the flow of supplies from North Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia. Many of these supplies move partway by truck; we have been bombing the trucks but, until recently, not the fuel-oil supplies that power them. We should bomb all the fuel-oil depots in North Vietnam. Electric power plants, which provide power for a variety of war purposes, should also be bombed.

Interdiction of the many branches of the Ho Chi Minh Trail (which leads over various

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passes from North Vietnam through Laos or Cambodia into South Vietnam) must be improved—by eliminating some of the restrictions that now hamper bombing and particularly by assigning more trained Forward Air Controllers, both on the ground and in the air.

Air cavalry raids by helicopter against Laotian bottlenecks on the supply route should be undertaken whenever possible. The doctrine of "hot pursuit" must be applied to any guerrilla forces that use Cambodia as a sanctuary.

At sea, the Navy's coastal surveillance and river patrols must be extended and tightened—to stop Vietcong gunrunning by junks and sampans. This will require more air and small-craft bases in South Vietnam and Thailand.

U.S. troop strength in South Vietnam should be doubled to a figure of 500,000 to 700,000 men, to enable U.S. and South Vietnamese forces to patrol areas that have been Communist sanctuaries for years. We must find and fix the main force of the enemy, and force him to expend his supplies in action, if possible. An enemy "body count" is not the proper yardstick by which to judge success in this kind of war. Even if the enemy refuses action and fades away into the jungles, or into the shadows of the U Minh Forest, the capture and destruction of his base camps, or his rice and food supplies, of his medicines and weapons and ammunition will reduce his combat capabilities. The war must ultimately be won on the ground by destroying or breaking up the main-force units of the Vietcong, and especially by destroying the enemy's bases of operations.

The final part of the strategy for victory—the part that will shape the peace—is the pacification program. The American and South Vietnamese military can launch search-and-destroy and search-and-clear operations; but only specially trained South Vietnamese administrative and paramilitary forces can *hold* the areas that are cleared. The pacification program—in the past mishandled and underemphasized—has this year started slowly but well; it must be pushed to the maximum. For one can confirm victory in a guerrilla war only if one wins the people over and protects them against the enemy.

This is a slow, a comprehensive, a tedious process. The administrative, police, educational and health authority of the central government must be built up from what Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge calls "the precinct level."

The enemy cannot win in a military sense; he is stymied on the field of battle. But political instability in Saigon, and U.S. impatience at home, may cause us to lose the struggle—politically and psychologically.

We have no easy choices—only grim alternatives. Victory, which means making it possible for a South Vietnamese government to govern without interference from outside, is possible; but it may not be possible soon.

The victory road will be long and hard and bloody. But defeat or stalemate in Vietnam will gravely impair the U.S. position in Asia and in the world; and if we lose, our children and grandchildren will face tomorrow a far worse problem than we face today.

(By Herman Kahn, director of the Hudson Institute (a nonprofit organization conducting research in the area of national security and international order); former member of the Rand Corporation; author of "Thinking About the Unthinkable, On Thermonuclear War, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios")

I have been asked by Look to describe my personal position, rather than give an analysis of the pros and cons. The first and overwhelming point is that whether or not one agrees with the steps that led to it, our present commitment to oppose force and terror by the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam is as solemn an engagement as any modern nation has made. I do not believe that commitments must be blindly kept, regardless of costs; but just as we should be careful about making commitments, we should be very careful about honoring them.

Maintaining the credibility of our commitments is not just a matter of "saving face." Our ability to support world peace and security, particularly without using excessive force, depends in great measure upon the faith that other nations repose in American commitments. (Germany, Japan, India and Israel, for example, restrain their activities in obtaining nuclear weapons partly because of American commitments.)

To renege on commitments as serious as those we have made in Southeast Asia could be a major step in a disastrous erosion of faith in the United States. If faith in our commitments became so weak that we would have to give excessive commitments in order to make them believable—for example, giving minor states control over our policy (as the British had to do with Poland in 1939)—then the likelihood of major escalation, such as a war with China, would be dangerously increased.

The United States also has a crucial interest in dispelling two illusions that have grown up since World War II: that radical terrorists almost always win; and that radical regimes can subvert, or intervene in, a neighboring area with little risk. History is replete with exampels of how a victory by terrorists in one area powerfully influenced the likelihood and the tactics of subversion in other areas. The invalidity of oversimplified "domino theories" should not lead us to underestimate the worldwide costs of letting the Vietcong succeed with their resort to violence. In addition, I am seriously concerned about the political and moral repercussions within the United States were we to "pull out" of Vietnam.

Our cause in South Vietnam is not immoral. Many think we are creating more destruction, more death, more human suffering than our cause justifies. But what would happen were we to let South Vietnam fall into the hands of the National Liberation Front? It is not likely that a victorious NLF would treat with restraint: the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao, the Catholics (each a community of about 1,000,000 human beings); the 500,000 South Vietnamese soldiers; the many other groups that have demonstrated they are anti-Communist; the tens of thousands who would probably be labeled enemies of a Communist state. Those who dismiss this likelihood need only look at how the Chinese Communists and the Indonesian Army treated their opponents, and might ask themselves if the victorious NLF is likely to be more restrained. Nor should the West view with equanimity 15,000,000 people passing behind a Communist Iron Curtain.

What, then, should we do in Vietnam now?

1. An important aspect of the battle for "the hearts and minds of men" is this: Which side will succeed in symbolizing national identity? Many Vietnamese prefer good government to bad government, but even more prefer self-government to foreign control. We should encourage self-government, and should minimize our nonmilitary role.

2. Thus, we should accept and encourage more independence by the South Vietnamese in handling their political and economic problems. Even if a Buddhist nationalist comes to power, he is likely to be more opposed to the NLF than to the Americans; and if his government does not want our protection, or makes it impossible, we can *then* leave with honor—having fully honored our solemn commitment. (I assume we would not have connived at his election or policy.)

3. To the extent that it can be encouraged to, the Saigon government should compete with the Vietcong in promises of social reform, should launch selective but significant social-reform programs now, and should carry out pacification programs in a legal and humane way.

4. We should replace the present system of four levels of American advisers in the Vietnamese Army (which tends to result in four levels of double veto) with a simpler, more unified system.

5. We should urge the South Vietnamese Army to make promotions and assignments on the basis of merit. The efficiency of the fighting forces would be greatly increased if the army adopted the simple expedient of promotions on the battlefield, raising enlisted men to officer rank, regardless of education—rewarding proven ability, aggressiveness and dedication.

6. The amnesty programs offered to the Vietcong should be broadened and liberalized. The counterinsurgency wars that have been won since World War II often involved generous, well-publicized amnesty programs. (The Philippine Government, for instance, promised and gave farms to many Huk guerrillas who surrendered.) Although the South Vietnamese think it wrong to treat rebels better than loyal peasants, it is clearly worth a good deal to South Vietnam to make surrender safe and attractive, and to guarantee a decent, useful life to the man who surrenders.

7. We probably do not need to escalate military activities against North Vietnam. The military tactics we have introduced—aggressive patrolling to carry out search-and-destroy and clear-and-hold operations—contain many significant benefits that have not yet been fully realized, but should soon show important results.

8. I believe we can pacify Vietnam. A stable, reasonable government there is possible. Although the political situation looks bad today, many current political problems are likely to be solved following, and as the result of, military victories. The political difficulties in South Vietnam are likely to be diminished when and after elections are held—especially if the elections follow military victories.

Our present policy is the only realistic alternative the United States really has. It is a hopeful policy. If we are patient, resolute, realistic, that policy can probably realize our goals. I have yet to hear of an alternative that is not likely to involve costs far greater, far more deplorable, far more inhumane in both the short and long run.

(By Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Albert Schweitzer professesor of the humanities, City University of New York; professor of history, Harvard, 1954–61; twice winner, Pulitzer Prize; winner, National Book Award; assistant to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson; author of "A Thousand Days," etc.)

The moderate critics of the administration's Vietnam policy do not question its proclaimed purposes; resistance to Communist aggression, self-determination for South Vietnam, a negotiated settlement in Southeast Asia. They do question, with the greatest urgnecy, the theory that the way to achieve these objectives is to intensify the war. The more we destroy Vietnam, North and South, in their judgment, the less chance there will ever be of attaining our objectives. The course of widening the war, moreover, will mire our nation in a hopeless and endless conflict on the mainland of Asia, beyond the effective use of our national power and the range of our primary interests—and may well end in nuclear war with China.

And the alternatives? Instead of supposing that a guerrilla movement can be crushed by strategic bombing, instead of using military methods to solve a political problem, we must adapt the means we employ to the end we seek.

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1. Stop the Americanization of the war. The bitter fact is that the war in Vietnam can *never* be won as a war of white men against Asians. It cannot be won "unless the people [of South Vietnam] support the effort. . . . We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam" (President Kennedy, 1963). The more we Americanize the war—by increasing our military presence, by summoning Saigon leaders, like vassals, to conferences in an American state, by transforming a local war in Vietnam into a global test between America and China—the more we make the war unwinnable.

2. A civilian government in Saigon. We have never had a government in Saigon that could enlist the active loyalty of the countryside, and we certainly do not have one in Marshal Ky's military junta. Instead of identifying American interests with Marshal Ky, and rebuffing the broader political impulses of the South, *we should long since have encouraged a movement toward a civilian regime that represents the significant political forces of the country and is capable both of rallying the army and carrying out programs of social reform.* If such a government should favor the neutralization of South Vietnam, if it should want to negotiate with Vietcong, *even if it should wish to release us from our commitment to stay in Vietnam,* we cannot and should not object.

3. Reconvene the Geneva Conference. We should persevere in the quest for negotiation. Since the Vietcong are a principal party to the conflict, it would appear obvious that peace talks at Geneva are meaningless without their participation. And since they will never talk if the only topic is their unconditional surrender, we must, unless we plan to exterminate them, hold out to them a prospect of a say in the future political life of South Vietnam—conditioned on their laying down their arms, opening up their territories and abiding by the ground rules of democratic elections, preferably under international supervision.

4. Hold the line in South Vietnam. Obviously, Hanoi and the Vietcong will not negotiate so long as they think they can win. Since stalemate is thus a precondition to negotiation, we must have enough American ground forces in South Vietnam to demonstrate that our adversaries cannot hope for military victory. I believe that we have more than enough troops and installations there now to make this point.

It is an illusion to suppose that by increasing the size of the American Army we can ever gain a reliable margin of superiority; for, by the Pentagon's preferred 10:1 ratio in fighting guerrillas, every time we add 100,000 men, the enemy has only to add 10,000, and we are all even again.

Nor does "digging in" mean a static strategy with initiative relinquished to the enemy. The South Vietnamese Army of half a million men is better suited in many ways than are Americans to search operations in the villages.

We should also limit our bombing in the South. Have we really no better way to deal with guerrilla warfare than the aerial obliteration of the country in which it is taking place? If this is our best idea of "protecting" a country against communism, what other country, seeing the devastation we have wrought in Vietnam, will ever wish for American protection?

5. Taper off the bombing of North Vietnam. Secretary McNamara has candidly said, "We never believed that bombing would destroy North Vietnam's will," and thus far, bombing the North has neither brought Hanoi to the conference table, demoralized the people nor stopped infiltration. As a result, pressure arise for ever-wider strikes—first oil depots, then harbors, factories, cities the Chinese border. But these won't work either. As we move down this road, we will only solidify the people of North Vietnam behind their government, make negotiation impossible and eventually assure the entry of China into the war. And even if we bombed North Vietnam back to the Stone Age and earned thereby the hatred of the civilized world, this still would not settle the present war—which, after all, is taking place not in North but in South Vietnam.

6. A long-run program for Southeast Asia. We should discuss with Russia, France, China and other interested countries a neutralization program, under international guarantee, for Cambodia, Laos, North and South Vietnam. If these states could work out forms of economic collaboration, as in the development of the Mekong Valley, the guarantors should make economic and technical assistance available to them.

A program of limiting our forces, actions and objectives still holds out the possibility of an honorable resolution of a tragic situation. A program of indefinite escalation offers nothing but disaster; for our adversaries can, in their own way, match our every step up to nuclear war—and nuclear war would be just as much a moral and political catastrophe for us as it would be a physical catastrophe for the Far East and the whole world.

THE MIRANDA CASE

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, in a recent issue of his column, "Capitol Punishment," Art Buchwald has made some observations in jesting guise which seem quite appropriate to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the Miranda case. Properly construed, the majority opinion in the Miranda case attempts to lay down some artificial rules which an arresting officer must repeat by rote like a parrot in order to make admissible in a criminal case the voluntary confession of the defendant that he is the party who committed the crime with which he is charged. I ask unanimous consent that Art Buchwald's observations may be printed at this point in the body of the RECORD.

There being no objection, Mr. Buchwald's observations were ordered to be printed, as follows:

CAPITOL PUNISHMENT: BABY FACE—A REMAKE

(By Art Buchwald)

Ever since the Supreme Court ruling concerning the protection of a defendant's constitutional rights at the time of his arrest, the motion picture people have been in a dither. Almost every gangster movie of the last 40 years is now outdated, and will have to be remade with the rights of the defendant kept in mind.

This is probably what the remarks of Baby Face Nelson will look like. Baby Face has been betrayed by his jealous girl friend and the cops have his farm hideout surrounded. The Chief of Police says over his loudspeaker, "Now hear this, Baby Face. The farmhouse is surrounded and you don't have a chance. Come out with your hands up."

"Drop dead, copper," Baby Face shouts from the window, firing a shot at the same time.

"I must warn you, Baby Face," the Chief says, "that anything you say will be held against you."

Baby Face lets go with a burst of a machine gun. "I don't intend to be taken alive, you dirty finks."

The Chief ducks behind his car. Kneeling, he says, "Baby Face, I have to advise you that you may either have a choice of your own lawyer or we will provide you with a public defender, and you do not have to say anything to us when you come out of the farmhouse with your hands up if you do not want to."

"I got lots to say," Baby Face shouts from the window. "Ha, ha, ha."

He lets go with another burst from the machine gun.

"If you're going to talk to us, Baby Face, you'll have to sign a waiver that no one made you say anything against your will."

"I'm signing nothing, copper. I know my rights. Like the case of Gonzalez vs. the State of Oklahoma, no one can lay a finger on me until I'm brought before a magistrate and given a hot meal and a bubble bath."

"Now listen carefully, Baby Face," the Police Chief says. "We know you've killed 12 bank tellers and robbed six post offices, but constitutionally you have nothing to fear. Even if we can prove our case, you can always appeal on the grounds that, because of this gun fight, you received adverse publicity in the newspapers, and could not get a fair trial."

Baby Face fires another burst from his machine gun. "That's what you say now. I haven't forgotten what happened in the Glutz vs. the People of Peoria, Illinois, case when the coppers tricked Glutz into a confession by giving him two tickets to the Green Bay Packers-Baltimore Colts football game."

"The Third Circuit Court threw out the Glutz conviction, Baby Face," the Chief shouts over the loudspeaker. "Didn't you read about the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in Nashville vs. Virginia Woolf?"

"I haven't seen the newspapers lately," Baby Face shouts. "I've been holed up here, and if you want me you're going to have to come and get me." Rat-a-tat-tat.

"Okay, Baby Face, have it your way, but don't say we're violating your constitutional rights."

The Chief gives the signal to charge and a hailstorm of lead fills the air. When the smoke clears, Baby Face is lying mortally wounded.

His mother rushes up to him and puts his head in her lap.

"They got me, ma. Tell Melvin Belli the cops cheated him out of a fee," Baby Face gasps.

"Don't talk, son. If the police doctor does not patch you up, we can sue him for malpractice."

"But how, ma?"

"Don't you remember, son, Dillinger vs. the People of Malibu Beach, California?"

VISIT ALABAMA

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, this is in the nature of a special report on a single tourist attraction in my native Alabama. As many Senators know, I have been urging visits to Alabama to see what my State really is like. I repeat that invitation today, and I want to invite attention to one of the newest national monuments, Russell Cave.

I say "newest," but this is only because this remarkable place has been a national monument for only a few years and because it is planned to open the monument formally this fall. In this cave, experts from the Smithsonian Institution and the National Geographic Society have found a record of the lives of people who lived there for about 8,000 years. We know from these records that people were living in Russell Cave 4,000 years before the building of the Great Pyramid of Egypt.

In the excavations which have been made thus far archeologists have found spearheads, arrowheads, pottery, tools, and other artifacts to recreate the lives of these people as they progressed in the degree of their civilization. The Na-

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in our streets and also toward some innocent bystanders.

The junior Senator from Ohio, throughout his rather long life, has never liked people who push other people around. There were, in some instances, individual policemen who acted irresponsibly.

For instance, in Newsweek of August 1 is pictured a Negro woman seated in an automobile, riddled by police bullets. Caption of the lady with blood streaming from her face is "Hough: Police Bullets Riddled a Car and Wounded a Young Mother." Surely that is evidence of irresponsible action by police.

Mr. President, I stand by my statement of last Tuesday. We have a fine police department in Cleveland. We have a fine fire department. In my statement of last Tuesday I was careful to state it was a minority of policemen who did not conduct themselves as responsibly as they should under the circumstances. The great majority of the Cleveland police force is to be commended on its restraint during that difficult time.

Years ago I was a private in the Ohio National Guard. Those guardsmen called from their civilian vocations performed an unpleasant duty in a highly creditable manner. It is a fact as stated by me, and I reaffirm every statement I made last Tuesday, some of these guardsmen, most of them very young men, are unaccustomed to handling weapons in combat. A few appeared "trigger happy," as the saying is; and in a couple of instances their guns were fired accidentally. Fortunately, they injured no one.

For instance, the Cleveland Press reported an incident in which a National Guardsman fired several rounds from a machinegun at East 55th and Harlem Court when he thought he heard prowlers. Firing several rounds from a machinegun in a heavily populated neighborhood appears to me to have been the act of a trigger-happy guardsman.

I do assert that there was no nationwide conspiracy or Communist conspiracy, so-called, involved. While there may have been organized bands of hoodlums who took advantage of the riots to pillage and loot; while there may have been extremist groups who grasped the opportunity to exploit the violence for their own selfish ends; I am convinced that the riots themselves did not begin as a result of any conspiracy or organized plan. To state the riots were Communist, or otherwise, inspired appears to me to be a lame excuse to salve the consciences of those who do not want to, or refuse to, face the conditions that precipitated this disaster and similar ones in other great cities of our Nation—rat-infested slums, unemployment, poverty, hopelessness, frustration, and despair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to speak for an additional 3 minutes on another matter.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PRIME MINISTER KY

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, Prime Minister Ky, of the Saigon regime, has been in power since June 1965, when 10 generals conspired and overthrew the civilian government of South Vietnam.

I realize that at the Honolulu Conference, earlier this year, our President embraced him and made a sort of sweet-smelling geranium of him. Evidently power has gone to the head of this flamboyant so-called air marshal.

Shortly after the 10 generals made him Prime Minister, in an interview by an American reporter he was asked:

Who are your heroes, Marshal Ky?

His answer was:

I have only one—Hitler. I admire Hitler because he pulled his country together when it was in a terrible state in the early thirties. The situation here in South Vietnam is so desperate that one man would not be enough. We need four or five Hitlers in Vietnam.

When his fellow countrymen were fighting for liberation against the French colonial oppressors from 1946 to September 1954, where was Ky? Not only was Ky one of the tories in the war for liberation in Vietnam at that time, as he was being trained in the French Air Force, but the startling fact is that 9 of the 10 generals who overthrew the civilian regime at Saigon served with the French, fighting against the forces of the National Liberation Front, or Vietminh.

We Americans have regarded ourselves as the most revolutionary people in the world. We revere those patriots who won the Revolutionary War against England. We have always held low opinions of the American tories of that time who opposed those Americans who fought for the liberation of our country from colonial oppressors. However, we seem to be adhering at the present time to the tories in Vietnam.

Unfortunately at present time our Nation in the estimation of heads of state of most Asiatic countries has become the neocolonial oppressor. We are carrying on with our military might where the French left off. The United States has long been regarded as the most revolutionary nation in the world. We Americans revere the memory of those patriots who won the war for independence and then demanded that the first Congress write into our Constitution the first 10 amendments which we affectionately term our Bill of Rights. In our Revolutionary War the tories fought against the patriots.

We have alined ourselves directly with the tories of Vietnam in the civil war that is raging there. It is my hope that our President would disassociate himself from his involvement with Prime Minister Ky. Ever since the Honolulu conference earlier this year where the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces embraced this egotistical Prime Minister he has been too big for his britches.

Last October I interviewed him personally and I have followed his operations as best I can. Now this man, who himself was born in Hanoi and presently holds a position of power in Saigon which was usurped by the general's coup, apparently wants to go home. He has even had the effrontery to state that war between the United States and Red China is inevitable within 5 or 10 years. Why wait, he says. Talking as a native of what is termed North Vietnam he said ultimately the people of the North would overthrow the Communist regime there. Then he posed the question:

Does the free world have the patience to aid and build South Vietnam for the necessary period of waiting? If not, we must destroy the Communists in their lair—

He said. Then he said that he did not believe that the Chinese Communists would intervene directly in the Vietnamese war at this time. He said, however, it was certain they would intervene directly in Vietnam or elsewhere in Asia in 5 or 10 years unless they were stopped.

Very definitely Ky should be removed as Prime Minister of South Vietnam. We Americans should repudiate his statement that the U.S. Government should join in an allied invasion of North Vietnam and an armed conflict now with Communist China. Administration officials and Secretary of State Rusk should immediately dissociate our Government from the irresponsible statements made by our South Vietnam puppet Ky. If he wants so badly to return to Hanoi, let him do it on his own two feet and not by reason of the untimely death of thousands of killed and wounded young American fighting men presently involved in a miserable civil war in Vietnam, a far-off country which is of no strategic importance whatever to the defense of the United States.

FORTUNE MAGAZINE WARNS THAT ECONOMY IS SLOWING DOWN

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, our economy is slowing down. Despite a lingering tendency for prices to creep upward, the overall pace of economic activity is slowing dramatically.

Instead of being worried about whether to impose a restraint in the form of a tax increase, as so many were this spring, we ought to be making sure we do not sit on our hands as we head into a recession.

In recent statements, I have cataloged in detail the movement of several economic indicators showing clearly that the steam is going out of the boom. Consumer demand has fallen. The Index of Industrial Production and the gross national product have been increasing at far slower rates. Housing starts have plunged sharply.

An excellent, thorough review of the current economic situation has just been published in the August issue of Fortune magazine. It begins:

The change in the pace of economic expansion is now unmistakable. Most people welcome it as a relief from inflationary pressure. Many of the readjustments looming up, however, look to be more painful than has been generally recognized. Each month's new business statistics are revealing further deterioration in the prospects for underlying demand in the domestic economy. The figures begin to suggest a change in direction, not just a change in pace.

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see for raising this question of interest rates. The rates are getting very much out of line, and have created an almost impossible burden upon many segments of the American economy. The building industry, particularly, is becoming almost completely stagnated; and that industry is one of America's largest employers.

It seems to me that the situation requires a number of remedial actions. First, I do not believe we can carry on a war in Vietnam that is costing about $2 billion a month, and continually expand welfare programs of all types in this country. Some of those programs, under ordinary conditions, may be highly desirable; but we cannot have our cake and eat it, too. We must put first things first.

Then, as has been repeatedly pointed out by some Senators, we have almost six divisions in Western Europe at the present time, and that, as one of the distinguished members of the Appropriations Committee says, is costing our country $2.3 billion a year—much of it being converted into a dollar deficit and a gold drain—while at the same time we are continuing to draft more of our American sons to send them to South Vietnam.

It seems to me that we should reduce our troop commitments in Europe very drastically, and call on those countries which have greater gold reserves than we to assume a greater responsibility and a greater share of the burden in defending themselves.

Those are two things which can be done immediately. Those things can be done, in my judgment, by executive decision; and then whatever is necessary in addition to that to bring some semblance of order into the high interest rates that are slowing down the economy of our country, and in my judgment will place hundreds of thousands of people out of jobs in the not too distant future, certainly should be done.

I compliment and commend my distinguished fellow Senators for raising their voices in this matter.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, interest rates are of concern, or at least should be of concern, to every American. But we should not overlook the fact that interest represents the cost of money, and when a commodity is in short supply, prices rise. It so happens that there is a greater demand for money than the existing supply.

One great contribution this Federal Government could make to reduce that excessive demand and thereby reduce interest rates, is in line with what the Senator from Georgia has just said; and that is, to stop trying to carry on all of the expansive Great Society spending programs and financing them with deficit spending.

The Kennedy-Johnson administration, in the last 5 years, has spent $30 billion more than it has taken in, and $1.5 billion of our interest burden today goes to pay the interest costs on the deficits created by the Kennedy-Johnson administration.

There is one difference between the high interest rates today and the records of high interest rates in previous administrations. In other administrations they at least let the small investors join in reaping the benefits of the higher interest. This administration is placing a ceiling of 4.15 percent on E-bonds. It now proposes a ceiling on certificates of deposit for the small depositors while leaving the lid off for the larger ones.

I do not know why an administration that is always talking about wishing to help the smaller people is trying to penalize them on this point. It is sheer hypocrisy. The best thing this administration could do in the way of finding a solution to relieve the cost of interest and this excesive demand for money, would be to stop advocating the expansion of every Great Society idea. Many of these programs may be meritorious if we had the money to pay for them, but they are certainly not meritorious when we are borrowing money at 5¼ percent interest rates to defray their costs.

The Government should set the example of fiscal responsibility.

RACE RIOTS IN CLEVELAND

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I have here a letter dated July 24, from an Edward A. Spelic, 2848 Lorain Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio. The letter is a simple expression of what seems to be a humble citizen's view of problems confronting our metropolitan areas. I wish to read the letter:

Hon. Senator FRANK LAUSCHE: I would like to know if you could recommend medals for bravery for all the police and firemen of the city of Cleveland, Ohio, because the police and firemen this last week have been through hell because of these Communist-led race riots. Also, if you are going to take up a collection for the President's daughter's wedding, how about a collection for the police and firemen who are trying to help save an American city called Cleveland, Ohio, from being destroyed?

This letter has great significance to me in the thought that it expresses. Throughout the country, all too frequently, at the end of every riot, the charge is made of police brutality.

It has been sought to lead public opinion into the belief that the culprits of the riots are innocent, and that the firemen and especially the police are the guilty ones.

On Tuesday, July 19, at a meeting in what is known as the J.F.K. Club, in the Hough Avenue area of Cleveland, a group was assembled. In that group was present an individual who was a friend of the Government.

The subject of discussion of the group was the development of ways and means to snipe at firemen trying to put out blazes, and at policemen maintaining law and order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I ask unanimous consent that I may have 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LAUSCHE. While the meeting was in progress, policemen entered. With the policemen's entry, the gathering was dispersed. Hence it is not known what ultimately happened in the development of a design and plan for sniping at police and firemen. All we know is that while the firemen were facing the fire in the buildings, they were also facing the fire sent forth from the gun barrels of the rioters.

The time has come, Mr. President, when we had better stop denouncing police and firemen. At this point, I wish to take exception to what my colleague from Ohio stated about the Ohio National Guard. He stated that some of the members of the Ohio National Guard were trigger happy.

It is a tragedy that we had to bring them in. They were there in the face of danger. They performed valiant and proper service for the maintenance of law and order.

I thank Mr. Spelic for his letter. I cannot start a collection for the police or the firemen. I cannot secure awards for them for their courage and their adherence to duty.

I bow and express my gratitude as a citizen of Cleveland to the police, the firemen, and the National Guard, who brought order to Cleveland, after 96 buildings had been destroyed, some wholly and others partially, after violence had run rampant, and Government had been defied.

I regret to say this, but, in my opinion, Cleveland, Rochester, and Brooklyn are clearly training grounds for the worst that is yet to come. There are drills, trials, and maneuvers. Unless we back our Government and demand that the full force of law be used, including the police, the firemen, the National Guard, and the morale of the people, there is no foretelling what the end will be.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, some years ago I was chief criminal prosecuting attorney of Cuyahoga County, Ohio.

I believed then and I believe now that punishment, like a shadow, should follow the commission of any offense against law and order in our country.

I am, of course, opposed to mob violence, whether it be in Mississippi, Alabama, Ohio, or any other place in our Nation. On Tuesday of this week, I spoke out at some length on the disorders in Cleveland and on the frustrations, the helplessness, and hopelessness of those who live in what we term the Hough Avenue area of Cleveland. I mentioned their pent up frustrations which finally erupted in violence.

We in Cleveland have always been proud of our great city. It is a melting pot of all ethnic groups which have come here from the old country, seeking liberty and seeking to free themselves from oppression and to escape the hopeless situation they faced in the old country.

I stand by every statement I made on Tuesday in a rather lengthy speech which was referred to by the distinguished senior Senator from Ohio. I shall be happy to have any of my colleagues read that speech in its entirety, and not just take one sentence out of context:

In my opinion, the police of the city of Cleveland in some instances were guilty of acts of violence and of unnecessary brutality toward those who were violating the laws, burning buildings, rioting

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Confronted with such self-evident facts, the civil rights leaders tend to retort with the argument that if they did not promote civil disobedience, nothing would be done to improve the squalid surroundings in which many Negroes live. Anyone contemplating civil disobedience, however, in a society whose existence depends on respect for law is obligated to ask himself what alternatives exist before he turns to that last resort.

Here again, the President put it well: "The ballot box, the neighborhood communities, the political and civil rights organizations—are the means by which Americans express their resentment against intolerable conditions. They are designed to reform society, not to rip it apart."

And the truth is that many individual Negroes, even before the past decade's civil rights legislation, have come up from poverty and gotten out of the "ghetto." (The term, incidentally, is a loaded one; by connotation if not denotation it suggests the falsehood that some governmental authority is compelling Negroes to stay in segregated, walled-in areas.)

Many more can be expected to make a decent living for themselves without the leaders having to rip up society. What cannot be stressed too often, and what the romanticists fail to understand, is that for the most part they will have to do it on their own; the leaders would be better occupied helping them help themselves than in creating the climate for riots. Even then, there will be some members of any society, regardless of color, who for one reason or another will not be able to make a go of life.

It's time, we think, for a little bit of common sense and candor. Neither the society at large nor the Federal Government is responsible for the violence. Those responsible are the rioters and the teachers of casual disregard for law and order.

U.S. OBLIGATIONS IN ASIA

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, the Nation's press is being heard on President Johnson's significant speech on our obligations in Asia, and the early reaction is strongly favorable.

I have here editorials from three newspapers—the Baltimore Sun, Philadelphia Inquirer, and Washington Evening Star—praising various aspects of the President's speech to the American Alumni Council.

Each comments with approval on his call to Communist China for an atmosphere of conciliation.

There is firm agreement with his declaration that the United States is a Pacific power with responsibilities that cannot be shirked in Asia.

And there is hope that Hanoi and Peking will get the point.

This was a message reflecting our determination and our fervent desire for peace.

I ask that these editorials discussing the President's speech be inserted in the RECORD.

There being no objections, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Baltimore (Md.) Sun, July 14, 1966]

THE UNITED STATES IN ASIA

That the United States is a Pacific power, as President Johnson called in his speech on Asia, must be obvious to everybody, including the Chinese. We did not at some moment make a decision to become a Pacific power; we were forced into becoming one by the interests of our own national security, and by the vacuum left in that part of the globe after World War II. If a date is to be set, we can say that on December 7, 1941, the Japanese made inevitable the emergence of the United States as a major factor in all developments in the Pacific, among the islands of its seas and on the mainlands that border it.

It was on the fact of American power that the President built his examination of Asia and his view of its future. It is true, as he said, that Asia is now the crucial arena of "man's striving for independence and order," and true that if peace cannot be established there it cannot be secure anywhere. Mr. Johnson's listing of heartening signs in Asia, from Indonesia through Japan, and of examples of Asian cooperation, from Manila to the valley of the Mekong, was an impressive list. And his call to China to accept an atmosphere of conciliation was fervent and eloquent.

If the Chinese cannot be expected to see the sense of this, and to respond soon in the same spirit, still most of our allies will follow the President this far, in thorough agreement. What they might argue about is his statement that the Asia he sees so well "is the new Asia that is taking shape behind our defense of South Vietnam."

In the eyes of some of our allies, the defense of South Vietnam, while it may be necessary, is but one element of many in the Asian condition today. And then there is a question of how power is to be applied. Some of our allies believe that the very fact of the existence of vast American power, by sea and air, and if worst should come to worst, in nuclear terms, might suffice as a deterrent to the Chinese, without an American ground presence.

But would it serve further to persuade the Chinese toward conciliation? And where lies the point beyond which American efforts at conciliation would be taken by the Chinese as a sign of weakness, and by now-friendlier Asians as a signal of betrayal? This is the kind of tortured question the makers of policy have constantly to ask themselves. To pretend that the answers are easy is to assume an omniscience no one can possess.

[From the Philadelphia (Pa.) Inquirer, July 14, 1966]

THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER OF PEACE

President Johnson's call for reconciliation with Communist China and for peace with North Vietnam marks an important turn in U.S. policy in Asia. The President, in his televised address, made it clear that, if the proffer of peace is rejected by Hanoi and Peking, the war in Vietnam may last a long time.

Mr. Johnson, it is evident, is stepping beyond the previously stressed policy of "containment without isolation" of Red China and is looking beyond the present conflict in Vietnam to the situation in Asia after the war ends.

"A peaceful mainland China is essential to a peaceful Asia," he said. "A hostile China must be discouraged from aggression. A misguided China must be encouraged toward understanding of the outside world and toward policies of peaceful cooperation."

"The peace we seek in Asia," he said further, "is a peace of conciliation." He added that he did not mean a peace of conquest, or the simple absence of armed hostilities, but a settlement based on a broader concept of international relations.

He talked of the peace that could be sustained through international trade; through the free flow of people and ideas; through "the full participation by all nations in an international community under law."

Meanwhile, there is the war in Vietnam. The President defined the American position in blunt terms directed at Hanoi: "Victory for your armies is impossible. You cannot drive us from South Vietnam by force. The minute that you realize that a military victory is out of the question, and turn from the use of force, you will find us ready to reciprocate. We want to end the fighting. We want to bring our men home."

President Johnson's message to the Communists was one of peace, backed by determination to press on in Vietnam, if our peace offers get nowhere.

Will Hanoi and Peking get the message? Past history furnishes little ground for optimism. We still must make the effort.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, July 14, 1966]

AMERICA IN ASIA

President Johnson has held out the hand of conciliation to Red China, but the chances are that the response will continue to be hostile as long as the Mao Tze-tung hardliners remain in power. Not until a younger, less doctrinaire group takes over will a change for the better in Sino-American relations be likely.

Meanwhile, however, as the President has indicated to the American Alumni Council, measures can be taken by the United States, in concert with the free Asians, to prove that aggression is a losing game and to bring nearer the day when the Chinese Communists will be persuaded to come out of their self-imposed isolation, abandon force and cooperate with neighboring lands—and with America—to promote peace and economic progress throughout Asia. Among other things, our government might well go along with proposals offering Peking a seat in the United Nations, provided of course that this would not affect the membership or security of the other China, Taiwan.

In any event, with more emphasis than any of his predecessors, Mr. Johnson has proclaimed to the Chinese and the rest of the world that the United States is a Pacific power determined to meet its obligations in Asia. He has pretty well demolished the arguments of those domestic critics who hold that Europe, not the Far East, is America's main "sphere of interest" and that the Asians can be safely forgotten. In the President's words, "We are bounded not by one but by two oceans—and whether by aircraft or ship, satellite or missile, the Pacific is as crossable as the Atlantic . . . The economic network of this shrinking globe is too intertwined—the basic hopes of men are too related—and the possibility of common disaster is too real—for us to ignore threats to peace in Asia . . . Asia is no longer sitting outside the door of the Twentieth Century. She is here, in the same world with us, to be either our partner or our problem."

The President, in effect, has given Asia a status at least equal to Europe's in terms of its bearing on our country's well-being. Other Americans have made the same point in the past, but not so effectively. We think Mr. Johnson is altogether right.

POLITICS AND THE FBI

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, a great deal has been said in recent months about the attempted eavesdropping by agents of the Federal Government in my State of Nevada and many other places. These incidents have been carefully and systematically brought to the surface largely through the efforts of the distinguished junior Senator from Missouri and the staff of the subcommittee he heads which has been holding hearings on the subject.

Of late, a distinction has been made between the term "wiretapping" which was the term used in the 1934 law and the term "bugging" which represents an

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with recognition of the existing cultural values to be preserved.

When I first announced that a grant had been received for public housing here at Leech Lake, one commentator raised the question whether such an effort did not mistakenly create an enclave of Indians on the reservation. He asked whether we weren't making reservation life too attractive, and whether we might not better build the houses in cities to which Indians were migrating. I think that these questions miss the point.

Some of Minnesota's Indians want to leave the reservation now, and some will want to leave in the future. Our Government ought to be able to help house and train them for life off of the reservation. But many others want to stay on the reservation, and I don't think that Indians or any other citizen of this country ought to be told that they have to leave their home environment and move a few hundred miles to enjoy the basics of good housing and good education and a job. We shouldn't treat any citizen that way.

There is even more to it. Legally, the Indian has been free to leave the reservation for years. But this is a terribly hollow right when the life he leaves has failed—by lack of housing, education, health and social services—to prepare him for life in the modern economy of our cities. The sad unemployment figures of Minnesota's Indians both on and off the reservation testify to that fact. So far, the Indian has been "free" to remain in poverty on the reservation, or to go to live unemployed in a city slum. This choice is the indefensible product of a bankrupt policy.

So I think that there is only one reasonable direction open to us. It is to build on the reservations the kind of economy which will support jobs for Indians, the kind of housing which will permit a healthy life, and, above all, the kind of education which will motivate and provide skills for a productive job.

Our effort must place the reservation itself, and the Indians on it, in the mainstream of our economy. Then there will be real freedom. Freedom to leave the reservation, or to stay on it. And all America will be the better for it.

Such a program of economic and educational development will have to come, but it is not here yet. It can't be worked out from a distance, but must be done with initiative and cooperation of the Indian community here. It can't be the Washington plan; it has to be your plan. And let's not fool ourselves—it isn't going to happen overnight. It will take long, hard work by all of us, Indian and non-Indian. I want to help, and hope that you will ask me to. It is a hard job, but it can be done. And it will be worth it to make the reservation a good place to live and work. We'd better get to it. As President Kennedy said in 1963: "The American Indians hold a romantic grip on our imaginations, but I hope that they also hold a practical grip upon our efforts."

REMEDIAL READING RECOMMENDED FOR JOHN BIRCH SOCIETY

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, on June 6, I informed the Senate that I saw no need to go to extremes to discredit the John Birch Society because I thought that that organization was perfectly capable of discrediting itself.

The occasion for that remark was the receipt of a letter from a John Birch Society official who accused me of going to extremes in an attempt to discredit the society. The extreme to which I had allegedly gone was the insertion in the RECORD of an editorial published in a newspaper in my State, the Rochester Courier, of Rochester, N.H., commenting on the aims of the John Birch Society.

It was my opinion at that time that the John Birch Society could be relied upon to discredit itself, and my opinion turned out to be justified. I had the letter which I had received printed in the RECORD for June 6, and commented upon one phrase which seemed to me to illustrate the society's philosophy. That phrase was:

A benevolent dictatorship clearly implies complete justice and complete freedom.

Mr. President, the letter writers of the John Birch Society seem to want to amuse themselves in their idle time, and this morning my mail contained yet another letter from the same society official who had written me before.

It is addressed to:

DEAR SENATOR MCINTYRE'S GHOST READER—

And it goes, in relevant part, as follows:

On May 24, 1966, Senator MCINTYRE inserted a scurrilous newspaper editorial in the RECORD. It was from the Rochester (New Hampshire) Courier, and in essence accused the John Birch Society of proposing "dictatorship" as the ideal form of government for the United States of America.

I replied to the newspaper with a correction, and sent a copy to the Senator, which he inserted in the RECORD on June sixth, together with his own strange remarks. Since the Senator obviously cannot read, and I do not know your name, please excuse the anonymous salutation.

The letter then goes on to some more material which is not particularly informative, and concludes as follows:

Enclosed is $1, which I hope will initiate a fund to send Senator MCINTYRE to a remedial reading class.

Now, I happen to think this is a most intriguing contribution. I am particularly interested in the fact that the John Birch Society recommends remedial reading, in view of the very clear fact that the John Birch Society official who wrote to me is apparently unable to read the text of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

As can be noted from the first paragraph of his letter to me, he refers to a newspaper editorial from the Rochester, N.H., Record. I am certain that, with only the most rudimentary reading ability, this gentleman would have been able to glean from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of either May 24 or June 6 that the editorial in question came from the Rochester, N.H., Courier.

As this letter indicates, it is the John Birch Society official who has trouble reading.

I stated a few weeks ago, as I restated today, that the John Birch Society was perfectly capable of discrediting itself. Once again, the society has proved its own point, by sending me a letter about remedial reading which conclusively shows the society's own problems with reading. I feel that this is the most generous interpretation which can be placed on this matter, although at least one member of my staff has suggested that this error merely shows the John Birch Society's careless attitude toward facts.

In any event, I emerge from this correspondence $1 the richer, and, considering the source of the contribution, I feel that this is truly an embarrassment of riches. I have decided to donate this contribution to the Anti-Defamation League, where the funds gleaned from the dues of John Birch Society members, I am certain, may be used to help stem oncoming waves of extremism.

A TIME FOR CANDOR

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, the Wall Street Journal for July 27, 1966, carried an editorial in which the writer made some timely observations in respect to the rioting and looting which has been going on in some of our major cities and the attempts of some persons to justify it. I ask unanimous consent that such article be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed as follows:

A TIME FOR CANDOR

This summer's harvest of horror—murder, arson, looting in city after city, week after week—is prompting ever more insistent questioning. Why? Who is to blame? Strangely enough, the response of a good many people is that it is not the fault of the rioters but of the general society and, if you please, the Federal Government.

One editorialist was moved to express the sentiment in the following extremist fashion: "The (Federal) housing program is too small. The poverty program is too small. It is not the riots in the slums, but these lame and inadequate programs that are the real disgrace of the richest nation on earth."

We submit that attitudes of that sort are an unmerited rebuke to America and the millions whose hard work and hard thinking have made it the most abundant and just nation on earth. We are glad that President Johnson, at least, is not thus beguiled; while commiserating with the plight of slum-dwellers, he is forthright in his condemnation of riots that tear at the very fabric of of the community. "Our country can abide civil protest . . . it cannot abide civil violence."

Let us look a little more closely at the catalog of charges against the "inadequacy" of Federal efforts.

Large-scale Federal housing aid for low-income families has been going on for many years at a cost of many billions in tax dollars. It has failed indeed, but its inadequacy is not in terms of cost but in terms of concept. The same applies to the bulk of the activities launched by the more recent antipoverty program.

The fundamental conceptual flaw is a sentimental view, reminiscent of Rousseau, of the nature of man. According to this interpretation, man is inherently good and perfectible and is held down only by the external forces of society. Put him in pleasant surroundings, or give him enough money, and all will be well.

The inescapable corollary is that the society rather than the individual is responsible for his behavior, however ambitionless, venal or criminal. The doctrine has been preached with so much vigor, and not only in connection with civil rights, in contemporary America that it is hardly surprising to find some of the listeners taking it literally.

Experience, to put it mildly, lends little credence to the romantic view of man's nature; left entirely to our own devices, relatively few of us would qualify for sainthood. In that context, the political triumph of the American design of 200 years ago is that it engineered a maximum of personal liberty with a minimum of governmental compulsion. But the order is there, and it has to be, else the design falls.

Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400090002-7